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Jurisdictional Colonisation in the
Spanish and British Empires: Some
Reflections on a Global Public Order
and the Sacred
MÓNICA GARCÍA-SALMONES* AND LUIS ESLAVA**
INTRODUCTION
A PUBLIC LEGAL order that aspires to be global must involve thepossibility of the sacred. The international legal system should thus be opento the sacred if it strives to create order among states in global governance.1
These claims arise from a reflection on international law in which we have tried to
move beyond imperialistic conceptions of order and modern fears about the role of
religion in international law. Here we examine the relation between religion and
international law by applying a genealogical approach to two important legal
international projects for ordering the world: one theological, the other humanist.
Two imperial stories of universalism, redemption, conquest and conversion are
recounted. The first occurred during the initial conquest of the New World, and its
main characters are the Spanish Empire and the indigenous people of South
America. The second story concerns the British Empire and European colonisation
in North America.
The aim of this article is to sketch some similarities, differences and lessons of the
expansion of British and Spanish jurisdictions into the New World. While both
these imperial projects relied on the deployment of their law throughout the
Americas, the manner in which the exogenous law became implanted in the reality
of the new lands and subjects was quite different, due to struggles between the
divine and the terrestrial aspects of international governance in contemporary
European political thought. Imperial authorities have always used law and space to
establish power in a new land: new understandings of the nature of law that were
formulated during the rise of modernity crucially affected the manner in which law
was applied in the concrete spaces of colonisation and articulated in the daily life of
* PhD Candidate, Erik Castrén Institute of International Law and Human Rights, The University of
Helsinki, Faculty of Law.
** PhD Candidate, Institute for International Law and the Humanities, The University of Mel-
bourne, Melbourne Law School.
1 Since it is true that religion has no monopoly over ethics or morals, the sacred refers here to the
most purely religious categories with no other equivalent in the secular world. See JHH Weiler, ‘La
tradición judeo-cristiana entre fe y libertad’ in J Ratzinger et al, Dios salve la razón (Madrid, Ediciones
Encuentro, 2008) 191. For other philosophical and moral teachings about world order, see for example,
FT Chen, ‘The Confucian View of World Order’ in MW Janis and C Evans (eds), Religion and
International Law (The Hague, Nijhoff, 2008).
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imperial subjects. In the Spanish Empire, order was produced through law founded
in religious belief; for the British Empire, order was derived from the new liberal
law of modernity. The decline of the Spanish Empire and the emergence of its
British counterpart mark the transition between these two conceptions of law. As
the Spanish Empire’s power and its theocentric interpretation of international law
receded, the remaining competing jurisdictional systems—the British Empire and
the Westphalian state system—responded with a secular conceptualisation of law
and politics. Our current conception of international law is the legacy of a
resistance by European leaders to conceive of a sovereignty that would not
incorporate spiritual sovereignty.2 There is a certain parallel between the Westphal-
ian moment at the beginning of modernity and the nascent era of global govern-
ance. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the scope of activities performed
by empires and states had expanded profoundly, not only because of newly
discovered territories and peoples, but also because recent acquisition of theological
jurisdictions had brought forth substantive and transcendental matters that the
theological encompassed. The key question at the beginning of modernity was how
to impose a universal order on the relations between distinct territorial units, states
and other international actors at a time when the universal language of Rome and
its juridical apparatus were no longer valid. Arguably, it was the very posing of this
question that inaugurated modernity, and the international legal system continues
to be shaped by its structure and implications.3 Therefore, the enquiry and search
for an order in international law (both in practice and theory) is as urgent as when
it was first formulated.4
Current legal theorists have questioned classical positions on the question of
public order, and claim that international law is intrinsically indeterminate.5 Other
theorists regard classic international law as a type of basic constitution, since it
supports a legal community of formally equal partners. Here the force of the
normative self-understanding of modernity provides the foundation of a procedural
constitution that promises order amongst de facto unequal sovereigns.6 A third line
of inquiry has focused on how international law consolidates the status quo and
2 On the key position of the spiritual sovereignty in the negotiations of Münster for both the United
Provinces and Spain, see generally, LM Baena, ‘Negotiating Sovereignty: the Peace Treaty of Münster,
1648’ (2008) 28 History of Political Thought 617.
3 cf S Felman, Jacques Lacan and the adventure of Insight (Cambridge MA, Harvard University
Press, 1987) 103.
4 See especially, R Wolfrum and V Röben (eds), Legitimacy in International Law (Heidelberg,
Springer, 2008).
5 M Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia. The Structure of International Legal Argument
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006). For the fact that Koskenniemi’s book has often been
cited but rarely challenged, see D Kennedy, ‘The Last Treatise: Project and Person. (Reflections on
Martti Koskenniemi’s From Apology to Utopia)’ (2006) 7 German Law Journal, 982. See also, M
Garcia-Salmones, ‘The Ethos of the Rule of Law in the International Legal Discourse: Portrait of an
Outsider’ (2008)10 International Community Law Review 29.
6 J Habermas, Der gespaltene Westen (Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 2004) 131, 148, 192; B
Kingsbury, ‘Sovereignty and Inequality’ (1998) 9 European Journal of International Law 599.
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thus perpetuates injustice, rather than promoting an emancipatory international-
ism. On this view, a fair international order requires the return to international
relations structured by national law and national interests.7 Since Cold War
tensions have eased, the simple hard secular view of international law has been
shown to be insufficient to address these critiques, and many theorists have
demonstrated a new sensibility towards the ethical and the religious.8 This has been
interpreted as a sign of a loss of faith in the secular project of modernity.9
The question of political agency has become a key issue in the future of
international law, taking precedence over other problems such as the economic
structure, the weight of history, the cultural origins and the power of the state.10
Moving beyond the positive legal materials, it is argued, international law must
confront the political question in order to cope with present challenges. Neverthe-
less, international law as such seems to be endemically ambivalent, between
universalism and empire. The duck-rabbit model of international law has been
proposed as a way of capturing the sense in which international law contributes to
a genuine desire in the powerful to avoid conflict and injustice.11
Finally, in an era of global governance, there is a need to rethink notions of
democracy so that they might be meaningfully employed in the international legal
system. Critical thought is most attuned to the legitimacy of international law when
it is expected to establish a terrain between pure normativity and the pure politics
of the powerful.12 This paper shares concerns about a de-territorialised interna-
tional law with capacity to outlaw the powerless—a version of international law
that resembles past imperial practices. We wish to interrogate this legal structure
and in doing so take seriously the role played by colonial history in the formation
of international law.13 The outstanding problems and critiques of international law
have motivated us to transplant our reflections on global order in late modernity to
the era of colonisation in South and North America through the Spanish imperial
cities of God and the British rational jurisdictions. In the following two sections, we
dissect the complexity of the public orders of the British and Spanish Empires with
the purpose of making their imperial legal attributes visible. Following a review of
7 Wolfrum categorises this position as voicing Schmittian ideas. See R Wolfrum, ‘Legitimacy of
International Law from a Legal Perspective: Some Introductory Considerations’ in Wolfrum and Röben
(eds), Legitimacy in International Law (n 4) 3; C Schmitt, Die Kernfrage des Völkerbundes (Berlin, F
Dümmler, 1926).
8 See especially, D Kennedy, ‘Losing Faith in the Secular: Law, Religion, and the Culture of
International Governance’ in MW Janis and C Evans (eds), Religion and International Law (The Hague,
Nijhoff, 1999) 311, 312.
9 ibid 316.
10 B Rajagopal, ‘Martti Koskenniemi’s “From Apology to Utopia: A Reflection”’ (2006) 7 German
Journal of International Law, 1089, 1090.
11 For a similar use of this image in a legal issue see A Cockrell, ‘The South African Bill of Rights
and the “Duck/Rabbit”’ (1997) 60 Modern Law Review 513. See especially the image of the duck-rabbit
in L Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford, Blackwell, 1978 [1953]) 194. See also, E
Jouannet, ‘Universalism and Imperialism: The True-False Paradox of International Law?’ (2007) 18
European Journal of International Law 379.
12 JHH Weiler, ‘The Geology of International Law – Governance, Democracy and Legitimacy’
(2004) 64 Heidelberg Journal of International Law 547, 552.
13 R Falk, B Rajagopal, and J Stevens, ‘Introduction’ in R Falk, B Rajagopal and J Stevens (eds),
International Law and the Third World (London, Routledge-Cavendish, 2008).
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the theological grounds that sustained the Spanish imperial project, we examine
how the rise of the British Empire in the seventeenth century involved a complex
matrix of theological, legal and political transformations. Several conceptual shifts
that occurred during this process indelibly coloured the meaning of key notions
such as sovereignty and common law, and revised the nature assigned to imperial
subjects. The importation and violent application of the two European legal orders,
with no previous topos in the new territories, required a conversion of new imperial
subjects. Although the religious aspect of the British conquest has been largely
glossed over, the Spanish and British imperial projects display a striking similarity
in this regard.14 In particular, we consider the ways in which a secular order may
become quasi-religious when it requires total allegiance of its subjects.
In the final section, we reflect upon current visions of global public order, using
insights drawn from our analysis of the Spanish and British imperial projects. These
two legal histories of colonisation focus our attention on the role of the sacred in
international law and global order.
THE IMPERIAL CITIES OF GOD
Inscribing the Spanish Empire in Land
Unlike the era of settlement by British dissenters in the seventeenth century and its
reliance on liberal interpretations of law and order, the nature of government,
religion, and social relations appeared uncontroversial during the late fifteenth and
early sixteenth centuries. After the Moors’ surrender on the Iberian Peninsula in
1492, the Spanish extended their Christianisation programme to the New World,
with absolute certainty of the social propriety of their ways and the religious
righteousness that justified their goals and means.15 The Catholic monarchs,
Ferdinand and Isabella, conjoined Christianity and Spanish civilisation into a
seamless cultural-moral complex that defined all political, religious or cultural
alternatives as heretical and odious. Empire-building and social governance were
pragmatic extensions of the eschatological narratives of Catholicism.
This unity of sovereignty, governance and religion placed particular emphasis
on the role of founding cities during colonisation. Cities were the administrative
centres of the colony, the reproducers of capital, the seat of ecclesiastical power,
and the space for all cultural activities: where education was received, history was
written, and humanity advanced. In founding satellite cities, the major secular and
theological foundations of the Spanish colonial enterprise came together:
14 For a summary of historiographical traditions of the British Empire, see A Webster, The Debate
on the Rise of the British Empire (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2006).
15 MD Szuchman, ‘The City as Vision–The Development of Urban Culture in Latin America’ in GM
Joseph and MD Szuchman (eds), I Saw a City Invincible: Urban Portraits of Latin America – Jaguar
Books on Latin America 9 (Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield, 1996) 2.
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humanism, Catholicism and a revitalised notion of jus gentium.16 Cities were
ideal spaces for the sacred and the human to enter in a perpetual communion. In
the foundation and planning of new cities, the Spanish imagination was thrilled
by the encounter between divine and civil jurisdictions. Spatial explicitness rather
than subtlety was the key mode of this project. The ordering of space according
to law enabled an explicit coordination of the experience of being a subject. For
both indigenous and European subjects, placement within or around jurisdictional
urban clusters materialised their location in the Empire’s diagrammatic of power
abroad and their positioning in a transcendental order that aimed to approach the
sacred.
In a pragmatic reading of Augustine’s topographic taxonomy of the world,
Spanish colonisers realised that the city of man differed to the city of God.17
Despite Christianity’s designation as the official religion of the Spanish Empire, and
the Church as the heart of the city of God, Augustine declared in De Civitate Dei
that its message was spiritual rather than political. Christianity, Augustine argued,
should be concerned with the mystical, heavenly City of Jerusalem (the New
Jerusalem), rather than with Earthly politics. The city of man was therefore a
platform for crafting the self in order to gain access to the city of God. On this
view, the city of man should follow a ‘natural order’. Following this interpretation,
the Spanish Empire sought to organise their cities according to ‘nature’, and thus
connect Christian subjects (both conquerors and conquered) with a sense of
proportion, which itself culminated in understanding the proportions of the greatest
work of art: the godlike human body. This cosmology viewed all matter, including
people, within a linear and hierarchical world—an order that should be reflected in
the order of cities.
In 1573, King Phillip II of Spain crystallised the natural/organic view of urban
affairs and its role in the construction of the Spanish Empire in the Ordinances for
the Discovery, New Settlement, and Pacification of the Indies (the Ordinances).18
The Ordinances are a paradigmatic piece of urban legislation in which it is possible
to read how the Spanish Empire guided the foundation, construction, indoctrina-
tion and administration of its colonial communities.19 While the earliest voyages of
16 RM Morse, ‘Introducción a la Historia Urbana de Hispanoamérica’ in F Solano (coordinator),
Estudios sobre la ciudad Iberoamericana (Madrid, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas,
Instituto Gonzalo Fernandez de Oviedo,1983) 17.
17 St Augustine and J Healey (translator) The City of God (London, Dent, 1931).
18 The norms on urban foundation and planning were part of the Ordenanzas de Descubrimientos y
Nueva Población y Pacificación de la Indias (1573). These are divided into 148 chapters: the first 31
chapters were dedicated to the discoveries, chapters 32 to 137 dedicated to new populations, and
chapters 137 to 148 to the pacification of the Indies. Later in the colony, they were included in Titles V,
VI, VII, VIII and XII of Book IV of the ‘Recopilación de Leyes de los Reinos de las Indias’ (first
published in 1681). See G Guarda, ‘Tres reflexiones en torno a la fundación de la ciudad indiana’ in F
Solano (ed), Estudios sobre la ciudad Iberoamericana (Madrid, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones
Científicas, Instituto Gonzalo Fernandez de Oviedo,1983) 89–96; and JE Hardoy, ‘La Forma de las
Ciudades Coloniales en la América Española’ in F Solano (ed), Estudios sobre la ciudad Iberoamericana
(Madrid, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Instituto Gonzalo Fernandez de Oviedo, 1983)
318; J Kinsbruner, The Colonial Spanish-American City: Urban Life in the Age of Atlantic Capitalism
(Austin, University of Texas Press, 2005).
19 Previous and subsequent legislation included the 1523 Charter by Charles V, and the Recopilación
de las Leyes de las Indias (1680). However, the Ordenanzas de Descubrimiento y Población of 1537 is
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conquest to the Americas were marked by savagery, by the time of King Phillip’s
Ordinances the official response was to adopt a soft yet combative adjudication of
the New World and its people that fulfilled pragmatic and celestial requests—a
combination that profoundly informs the Renaissance understanding of jus gen-
tium.
By 1573, the Italian Renaissance had taken hold in Spain, and Spanish humanists
and royal advisers had become familiar with Roman urban organisations through
the translation of Vitruvius’ De Architectura (translated into Spanish as Medidas
del Romano).20 A normative approach to imperial expansion (grounded in the new
interpretation of jus gentium) was thus married to a more technical concern with
the role of spatial distribution in human affairs. Moreover, while the new norms
allowed the conquerors to acquire effective material possession of colonial territo-
ries, they also resembled Aquinas’ prescriptions for the ideal King.21 According to
Aquinas, the city was the natural vehicle for the fulfilment of Christian ideals, due
to the possibility of mastering the self through the mutual dependence, intellectual
and common surveillance proper to city life.22 Following Aristotle, Aquinas
envisaged the city as the measure of one’s morality. Therefore, the King should be
engaged in a constant mission to urbanise the world of man: founding a town was
the royal equivalent of the creation of the world.23 Although his power could only
be realised at the material level of the subjects, the King was a terrestrial juncture in
a power relationship that extended far beyond human existence.
In the Spanish imperial project, the definitive differentiation between the sacred
and the secular that would come to characterise the British colonisation of North
America and mark the emergence of a modern international law was a rhetorical
partnership that allowed the conqueror to intervene in the world in order to achieve
transcendence. The metaphysical dimensions of space and governance were inten-
tionally made indistinguishable in order to achieve sovereign presence across the
new lands and subjects. Importantly, the sovereign presence aimed to permeate the
mundane and sacred dimensions of daily life.
still the most cited normative document in which Spanish planning ideas are found. See for a critical
review of normative sources of colonial Spanish town planning in America, R Martínez Lemoine, ‘The
classical model of the Spanish-American colonial city’ in J Madge and A Peckham (eds), Narrating
Architecture: A retrospective anthology (London, Routledge, 2006).
20 The ordinances were inspired by the classical Roman treatise of Vitruvius De architectura, which
was rediscovered by the Florentine humanist Poggio Bracciolini in 1414. The first known edition of
Vitruvius was in Rome by Fra Giovanni Sulpitius in 1486. Translations followed in Italian (1521),
French (1547), English, German (1543) and Spanish (1526) and several other languages. The Latin
edition of Vitruvius’ book, published in 1582 was dedicated to Phillip II. See S Kostof, The City Shaped:
Urban Patterns and Meaning Through History (New York, Bulfinch Press, 1991) 115.
21 Kostof, The City Shaped (n 20) 108–11.
22 T Aquinas, De Regimine Principum, discussed in RM Morse, ‘Introducción a la Historia Urbana
de Hispanoamérica’ in F Solano (coordinator), Estudios sobre la ciudad Iberoamericana (Madrid,
Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Instituto Gonzalo Fernandez de Oviedo, 1983) 10–53.
23 Kostof, The City Shaped (n 20) 111.
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Marking and circumscribing the sovereign presence
The material nature of the city was regarded as a suitable instrument to discipline
subjects through spatial positioning. Phillip II’s Ordinances were issued as part of
the Crown’s desire to institute a systematic sovereign presence and transcendental
authority in the Empire. It was a normative effort to make the colonial enterprise
an intelligent carrier of a sovereign spatial economy. In this context, a ‘sovereign
spatial economy’ conveys the sense in which a local jurisdiction acts as a spatial
configuration of power, an instrument that expands and contracts in response to its
capacity to develop individual subjects and their subjectivities. As such, the
Ordinances articulated planning technologies as a pedagogical practice, while
theological belief operated as the grounding narrative to approach space and
subjects. An example of the triangulation between theological convictions, control
of physical space and instruction of new imperial subjects can be delineated in the
foundation of cities by the Spanish Empire, during which the performance of
liturgical ceremonies materialised the divine and secular forces in the chosen site for
a new city. Bogotá, for instance, was founded twice because legal prescriptions were
omitted in the initial founding ceremony. Even though Jimenéz de Quesada, widely
remembered as the city’s founder, established 12 huts on the site of present-day
Bogotá in commemoration of the Apostles, and offered the city to the Lord on 6
August 1538, the legally recognised ritual was not completed until 29 April 1539.24
Here the formality of law ensured the teleological function of both space and
subjects.
The process of sovereign deployment through urban planning, and the relation-
ship between these and the manifestation of the sacred in the everyday life of
imperial subjects, may also be perceived in the selection and circumscription of land
urban settlement, and the subsequent distribution of property rights. Ordering to
possess and the localisation of subjects according to colonial rights and obligations
were one of the fundamental roles of urban planning. The colonial purpose fostered
through the Ordinances was not to dominate the land, nor to convert natives
immediately to Christianity. Pacification by Catholic missionaries would ultimately
complete the task of discovery and conquest initiated by urban planners.25 The
purpose of planning was to arrange space in a way that Christianisation and its
cosmological imaginary were visible on the landscape, a configuration that would
be later confirmed in the interior self of the imperial subjects.
There are many examples of how the process of selection, circumscription and
distribution of land functioned, but here we would only like to mention the criteria
that guided the process of land selection. According to the Ordinances, new cities
24 R Londoño, ‘En las nubes de Bogotá’ (2006) www.bogotacomovamos.org/scripts/
contenido.php?idCnt=1. See also, D Ramos Pérez, ‘La Doble Fundación de Ciudades y las “Huestes”’ in
F Solano (ed), Estudios sobre la ciudad Iberoamericana (Madrid, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones
Científicas, Instituto Gonzalo Fernandez de Oviedo, 1983) 131–38; M Lucena Salmoral, ‘Bogotá y las
tres Huestes: Estudio comparativo del reparto de oficios concejiles y encomiendas’ in F Solano (ed),
Estudios sobre la ciudad Iberoamericana (Madrid, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas,
Instituto Gonzalo Fernandez de Oviedo, 1983) 139.
25 See especially; MM del Vas Mingo, ‘Las Ordenanzas de 1573, sus antecedentes y consecuencias’
(1985) 8 Quinto Centenario 83–101.
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were to be founded next to indigenous towns, ‘populated by Indians and natives to
whom we can preach the Gospels since this is the principal objective for which we
mandate that these discoveries and settlements be made.’26 As noted above, the
initial act of possession was formalised by the deployment of legal formulae in
which a transcendental experience was married to an urban planning rationale that
defined the urban space as Spanish in opposition to an indigenous fringe. The
indigenous did not come initially to the colonial town; the colonial town came to
the indigenous.
The positioning of indigenous as cartographic outsiders was complemented by
instruction in commerce and the distribution of urban land property. The distribu-
tion of land was straightforward: as the indigenous population were physically
outside the city’s limits, they were excluded from the city’s internal distribution of
property rights. Following the Roman use of the grid as the official urban order, the
Ordinances specified a square central plaza where the main authorities were to be
situated. The rest of the city’s chessboard was distributed according to social and
religious importance, and citizens were permitted rural possessions in the same
order and proportion to their properties in the city. The indigenous, from the point
of view of the coloniser, were outside the city’s geography, and were thus both
topographically and semantically the other, an object for instruction and exploita-
tion. Forced labour was in this manner also organised around this relocation.
During the first century of the colony, indigenous people were required to pay
tributes in urban, rural, or mining form,27 which were enforceable due to the
proximity of indigenous settlements to the cities. The spatial relationship between
the city and the indigenous population obscured the original indigenous ownership
of the land and made their place in the colonial economic structure explicit.
Even as the indigenous people of South American became outsiders in their own
land, they occupied a key role in the political economy of the colonial city.
Indigenous bodies were understood to be capable of labour and silent carriers of
God’s voice. As a result, the initial command of the Ordinances was pragmatic, yet
also visionary. According to Article 5, conquerors were to ‘[l]ook carefully at the
places and ports where it might be possible to build Spanish settlements without
damage to the Indian population’,28 and if there was an unexpected encounter with
natives, they should always use commerce and ransom, instead of combative
preaching. Commerce and ransom were supposed to be intelligible to the Indians;
the gospel, on the other hand, had to be administered once the indigenous body was
immersed in the early capitalist system of the Empire. The revelation of the sacred
in the Empire’s order was only achievable through the incremental cancellation of
26 A Mundigo and D Crouch (translators), ‘Ordinance for New Discoveries, Conquests and
Pacifications’ (1573) Chapter 36; reprinted by The New City with permission from ‘The City Planning
Ordinances of the Laws of the Indies Revisited, I’ (1977) 48 Town Planning Review 247–68, The
University of Miami, School of Architecture www.arc.miami.edu/Law%20of%20Indies.html.
27 The indigenous forced labour was divided into rural work, mining work and urban work. In
1657, the required urban tribute amounted to one month every two years, mining to one year every
three years, and term of rural work was between six months to one year every three years. See Pedro F
Simón, Noticias Historiales de la Tierra Firme en las Indias Occidentales (Bogotá, Biblioteca Banco
Popular, 1982).
28 Mundigo and Crouch, ‘Ordinance for New Discoveries, Conquests and Pacifications’ (n 26).
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the indigenous body and territory, which in turn required the reconfiguration of
space and instruction in the normative premises of Spanish imperial law. The
Ordinances, epitomising these laws, operated under the central tension of the
Spanish colonial enterprise: how to ensure the Empire’s presence in the New World,
how to guarantee a sufficient labour force for the colonial economy, and, at the
same time, how to protect and Christianise the native population.
Cultivation of Subjectivities, the City, and the Emergent International Law
The corporeality of the imperial subject (both indigenous and coloniser) and her
subjectivity occupied the whole mind of the planner. The individual was a subject of
the monarch not only because of her physical presence within the kingdom; she was
also, and primarily, a subject of the monarch due to that inner space in which the
natural symmetry between the monarch and God was identified and made real
within the city. All the city’s inhabitants lived under this redeeming logic, and they
were all the potential subjects of salvation. Here it is possible to see how the
almost-human yet flawed nature of the indigenous subject, as theorised by
Francisco de Vitoria, was accommodated into the urban order. The city was the
place in which indigenous culture, its ideas of property and governance, was
realigned with the Empire’s order—the embodiment of a universal natural law.
Following Anghie’s critical reading of Vitoria, the indigenous personality was
conceived along two axes by the Spanish Empire:29 ‘First, the Indians belong to the
universal realm as do the Spanish and all other humans beings because … they have
the facility of reason and hence a means of ascertaining jus gentium which is
universally binding.’30 However, in Vitoria’s reading of the New World, ‘the Indian
[is] very different from the Spanish because the Indian’s specific social and cultural
practices are at variance with the practices [the normative foundations of jus
gentium] which are applicable to both Indian and Spaniard.’31 In other words,
focusing on the cultural practices of each society and assessing them in terms of the
universal jus gentium, Vitoria demonstrated ‘that the Indians are in violation of
universal natural law. Indians are included within the system only to be disciplined’
and to ‘save the Indians from themselves.’32
Jus gentium, the natural law that was supposed to regulate the relations between
sovereigns and the recognition of reason in all human beings motivated the
development of urban practices that would close the inconvenient cultural gap
between the indigenous and Spanish populations of colonial cities. Phillip II’s
pragmatic use of urban development law emulated Vitoria’s pragmatic take on jus
gentium. Establishing an urban order based on the assumption that both indigenous
and colonisers were ordered by a natural/sacred schema, Phillip II’s Ordinances
reintroduced divine law in the governance of colonised territory as a technical
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matter. The form of this reintroduction was, as Phillip II realised, more durable and
effective than any kind of combative preaching. It was the promotion of a divine
order through secular activities such as settling, travelling and trading.
Following the foundation of a colonial city, urban planners aspired to synchro-
nise the city with an ideal space in which subjects were industrious and politically
compliant. Territory and inhabitants, land and human flesh, were the raw materials
in the project to propel each city and its citizens towards the idealised space where
the sovereign signalled. This space might even be described as Utopia, a politically
commanding concept that means non-space but has nonetheless served as the
transactional spatial totem around which the monopoly of violence is exercised.
Utopia recreates, according to this argument, a sacred meta-space that fulfilled the
application of authority with transcendence, salvation and development.
The symbolic energies that lie behind the city were thus a symptom of a grand
redeeming project of ‘bringing the marginalised into the realm of sovereignty,
civilising the uncivilised and developing the juridical techniques and institutions
necessary for this mission.’33 Characteristic of this early encounter between the
nascent disciplines of international law and urban planning law is the existence of
another, the indigenous, who requires the protection of a transnational sacred
order.
THE RISE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE’S SOVEREIGNTY: FROM PROVINCIAL
LOCALISM TO EMPIRE
The Rule of Law in the Empire: Moving away from Theological Foundations
In spite of the wilderness of the new spaces and the foreignness of the new cultures
that they encountered, common law accompanied the British colonists on their
journeys abroad. Common law offered the colonists protection and comfort,
insofar as it was able to reproduce home without bringing the anxieties left behind.
The colonists’ identity was, to a large extent, preserved by the guarantees of the
rights and liberties of an Englishmen before the common law. Initially, the
government of the colonies was founded on the basis and traditions of a common
law territorial jurisdiction: this was a selective law that did not create legal spaces,
but followed British citizens wherever they were. That the Empire was carried
within the coloniser’s body had clear repercussions for the indigenous people
encountered by the British, who were thus radically excluded from British legal and
political institutions. The diagrammatic of power of the British Empire operated, in
principle, in the subject’s conception of himself, i.e. in the internal space that made
him subject to the common law.
The province of New York, captured from the Dutch in 1664, provides an
instructive example of how the British dominated their colonies in the North and
defended them against competing European interests. The struggle for sovereignty
between King and Parliament in England meant that the sovereign presence receded
33 ibid 333.
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into the background of the British management of colonial affairs. For a long
period, the province of New York was thus allowed to remain provincial. This
came to an end with the rise of the sovereignty of the British Empire (c 1688–1750),
which was marked by a renewed universalism and a deliberate attempt to withdraw
matters of interest to the metropolis, such as trade and security, away from local
governments.34 Importantly, however, both the local and imperial models of British
territorial administration lacked the ideal of the transcendental that characterised
the Spanish imperial expansion in the South. In the imperial framework, the story
of the provinces in the North concerns trade, European settlers, land grants,
common law, the new rule of law and, finally, the way in which virtual imperial
legislation stood hopelessly for the sovereignty of the British Empire in those
territories.
The juridical basis and external justification for the British Empire were a matter
of argumentation and study among legal philosophers and politicians of the time.
Agricultural arguments given in the seventeenth century were considered sufficient
to justify the British dominium over the colonies,35 although they would not satisfy
the justification of the imperium, with its distinctive system of public law and
government.36 Due to its own rejection of the Pope’s authority to attribute to the
Spanish Crown dominion over the New World—‘the gift of the empire’, as Hobbes
called it—the British Empire realised that it would soon be ensnared by the same
criticisms being levelled at the Spanish colonial expansion.37 When the Spanish
Crown’s arguments for America’s colonisation were called into question even by
Spanish subjects,38 the Protestant kings promptly took up and reformulated the
discussion about the legality and legitimacy of colonial enterprises.39 The British
desire to avoid the controversy surrounding Spanish colonisation is exemplified in a
conciliatory debate of the Council of the Virginia Company in 1607–08, on the
need to document the Company’s activities to reassure investors. According to the
decision, it was more dangerous than not to produce such a report. One of the
members of Company present at the Council summarised the recent experience of
the Spanish Empire:
34 See generally, RN Clinton, ‘The Proclamation of 1763: Colonial Prelude to two Centuries of
Federal-State Conflict Over the Management of Indian Affairs’ (1989) 69 Boston University Law
Review 329.
35 J Tully, ‘Aboriginal Property and Western Theory: Recovering a Middle Ground’ (1994) 11 Social
Philosophy & Policy 153.
36 D Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire (Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 2000) 98.
37 T Hobbes, Behemoth or The Long Parliament (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1990) 12.
38 The changing sequence of legislation and of language in Spain during the 16th century is
attributed to a large extent to a perceived lack of legitimacy in the colonial expansion. See especially,
J Medina Rivaud, ‘La invención de la ciudad Americana: Convenio entre la realidad y la imaginación.
Lectura yuxtapuesta’ in IM Zavala (ed), Discursos sobre la “invención de América” (Amsterdam,
Rodopi, 1992). Rivaud cites as an example a well-known text of the beginning of the colonisation by
‘el pedra Hontesions’: ‘With which right have you started an atrocious war against those peoples who
lived peacefully in their terrritories? You killed them each day when you want them to bring their gold to
you; and what is your care to instruct them in our religion? Are they not men? Do they not have reason,
soul? Should you not love them as yourselves? Be sure that under the present conditions you do not have
more possibilities of salvation than a Turk or a Moor’, 283. (translation by the authors).
39 Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire (n 36) 94.
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When after 50 years his fryars [of the Spanish Crown] declyn’d him from that sever and
unjust course and he labourd by men of all learning to provide himselfe of a more
acceptable title, all y[e] reasons, which were prepared to him, by men of discourse, from
y[e] Indians transgressing y[e] Law of Nature; from his Civilians for their denying
commerce: from his Canonists by y[e] Donation: and from his Devines, by propagation of
religion … can be gathered for him no title, of Dominions or Property, but only a
Magistracy, and Empiry, by which he is allowed to remove such impediments, as they had
against y[e]) knowledge of Religion.40
Despite their strong desire to avoid global censure of their colonial expansion, the
British anxiously sought meaning and a constitution for their empire. By 1573, the
Spanish had stopped using the term ‘conquest’ in the official language of imperial
politics. In his Ordinances, Philip II presented the legal basis for colonisation and
attempted to rationalise the imperial expansion, drawing on solutions offered by
lawyers and theologians of the day. The primary aim of Spanish colonisation after
1573 was to found as many territorial asentamientos as possible. According to the
text of the Ordinances, neither commerce nor conquest would be a priority for the
Spanish Empire in the American colonies.41 Spatial presence, and the civility
involved in the materialisation of this performance, became the public policy of the
Empire. On paper, at least, the plan for the Spanish Empire was therefore clear:
secular and theological aspirations were to be merged in the foundation of
asentamientos and their pedagogical rationale. By contrast, the grounds of the
British Empire were founded in Protestantism, and its commitments against the
principle of medieval dualism of Church and government, and in commerce.42 The
geographical spatiality of the British Empire and its physical materialisation were
downplayed in order to condense the Empire’s presence in the identity of its
subjects.
Englishmen in the Provinces and Later Ethnocentric Geo-Legal Spaces
The British Empire bestowed its colonists in North America with one of the few
certainties that had survived the tumultuous seventeenth century in Britain: the
common law. While the colonists thus enjoyed the traditional rights and liberties of
Englishmen, the British colonial enterprise lacked a uniform imperial design or
public policy. Without a public policy, neither the British colonists, nor the Native
Americans that they encountered, were capable of making transactions of this
precious good.43 In particular, the status of indigenous people was described in the
40 DB Quinn ‘Reasons against the publishinge of the Kinges title to Virginia’ in DB Quinn (ed) New
American World: A Documentary History of North America to 1612 (New York, Arno Press, 1979). Vol
III 418–19; quoted by Armitage, (n 36) 93.
41 MM del Vas Mingo, ‘Las Ordenanzas de 1573, sus antecendentes y consecuencias’ (n 25) 84−94.
42 Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire (n 36) 98.
43 To the high value attached by the colonists to common law, see generally DJ Hulsebosch,
Constituting Empire. New York and the Transformation of Constitutionalism in the Atlantic World,
1644–1830 (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press and American Society for Legal History,
2005) 104.
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colonial laws in different ways, since they were not automatically considered to fall
under British sovereignty. According to Mark D Walters, friendly Indian nations
were described as ‘being at “peace” or in “amity” with, “tributary” to, “allied” to,
under the “protection” of, or “subjected” to particular colonial governments’. They
were ‘either subjects of the Crown or alien friends’. Other Indian nations were
termed ‘“strange,” “foreign,” or “remote,” or as enemies’.44
The structure of a typical North American province was based on an ancient
system of territorial jurisdiction, the county palatine, with a proprietor as ‘the true
Lord’ of the land.45 The particularities of the territory, density and heterogeneity of
population shaped the peculiar features of the transplantation of common law. For
instance, when the English arrived to New York, the original Dutch population was
promised that they would be allowed to maintain their legal relations as they were
at the moment of the conquest. A peculiar mixture of legal traditions emerged.
When colonists invoked common law, they referred to a selection of British rights
and liberties that suited their particular situation and to which they felt entitled.46
Empire was a subjective experience of rational membership, activated through the
invocation of the common law. The spatial fragility of the British presence was thus
compensated by the requirement for a colonist’s strategic self-recognition as a
subject of the incoming British Empire. A liberal conception of imperial presence at
the individual level became the conduit of the Empire in the overseas colonies.
After the Calvin case, it was clear that only the English and Scots could have
access to the protection of English jurisdictional courts.47 However, Hulsebosch
cites a Member of Parliament concerned by the implications of the Calvin case:
… it might give a dangerous example for mutual naturalizing of all nations that hereafter
fall into the subjection of the king, although very remote, in that their mutual commonalty
of privileges may disorder the settled government of every of the particulars.48
At this early stage, England used common law principles to protect herself from the
cultural and political uniformity of a virtual empire that was physically remote and
44 MD Walters, ‘Mohegan Indians v. Connecticut (1705–1773) and the Legal Status of Aboriginal
Customary Laws and Government in British North America’ (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 785,
793.
45 The British Crown employed two agencies in the work of colonisation: the corporation and the
proprietor. See generally, HL Osgood, ‘The Proprietary Province as a Form of Colonial Government’
Part I (1897) 2 American Historical Review 644. HL Osgood, The American Colonies in the Seventeenth
Century (New York, Columbia University Press, 1904) Volume II Part III Chapter VI; HL Osgood, ‘The
Corporation as a Form of Colonial Government’ (1896) 11 Political Science Quarterly 259.
46 They could not, however, invoke a precedent that was non-existent in the province. See for
instance, E Moglen, ‘Settling the Law. Legal Development in Provincial New York’ (unpublished
dissertation, 1998) http://moglen.law.columbia.edu/publications/stl 19.
47 Robert Calvin, a Scot born after the accession of James to the English throne, sued for the
recovery of land in England that he claimed to have inherited. The decision held that those Scots born
after James became King of England were not aliens, despite the fact that they were not under the
authority of English Parliament and they lived under separate law in Scotland. On the important
consequences of the Calvin case for the colonies, see especially, B Black, ‘The Constitution of Empire:
the Case for the Colonists’ (1976) 124 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1157.
48 DJ Hulsebosch, Constituting Empire. New York and the Transformation of Constitutionalism in
the Atlantic World, 1644–1830 (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press and American Society
for Legal History, 2005) 21.
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detached from English traditions. Conversely, there was also a generally accepted
‘jurisdictional conception of law’ in the provinces, such that a New Yorker was
always entitled to a local legal forum. Overseas common law constitutionalism
offered further means for establishing a protected legal space, a defence against
invasive legislation of the British Parliament.49
In contrast to Spanish colonisation of the South, the British did not aim to create
legal geographical spaces as such. Nevertheless, both the British Empire and its
colonies were ethnocentric in their aspirations.50 For example, the British Empire
only intervened in legal or political conflicts with the Native Americans when they
involved a British subject. There were exceptions to the legal exclusion of
indigenous people. The Mohegan case originated in a dispute over land between the
province of Connecticut and the Mohegan Indians. In 1704, through their English
‘guardians’, the Mohegan Indians petitioned the Crown that certain transactions
regarding their land had been made illegally. In its defence, the province of
Connecticut claimed that the Native Americans were subject to colonial law and
colonial courts.51 The Crown established in this case a Royal Commission to decide
over the dispute. For the Royal Commissioner, the Natives were a distinct people,
thus subject to the law of nature and the law of nations. The hearing of such
international disputes fell under the jurisdiction of Royal Commissions, and not of
local courts.52 Evidently the solution on this particular question determined the
extension of the autonomy of the provinces and therefore, neither the Crown nor
the colonies wanted to deliver their legal position on it.
Under common law, the King had the dominium of the land, and as such
controlled every purchase of land from the Natives through the governors.53 This
was particularly striking because, properly speaking, not only the territory belonged
to the Native Americans, but culturally they belonged to the territory, and the
49 ibid 36.
50 Clinton speaks of ‘the characteristic ethnocentric British failure to understand Indian political and
legal structures’; although the British did not seek to govern the political structure of the Aboriginal
people, ‘they nevertheless profoundly affected Indian life through trade and diplomacy’: Clinton, ‘The
Proclamation of 1763’ (n 34) 363.
51 In 1640 the Mohegan chiefs ceded to English settlers all their lands except a reserve for farming
and hunting. In 1659 they ceded to Major John Mason the reserved land and his heirs in trust for the
whole Mohegan tribe ‘as their Protector and Guard’. The next year Mason transferred the lands to the
colonial government under the condition that it would reserve sufficient land to the Mohegan when
open to settlement. The Mohegan claimed that the transaction was invalid because they had not
participated in it. During almost a century, in successive appeals to the Crown the Mohegan and
Mason’s heirs claimed that the latter held the reserved land in trust for Mohegan use. In 1705 the Crown
through an appointed commission invalidated the transaction. After appeal by the colony in 1743, a
commission of review overturned the decision of 1705. The Mohegan Indians appealed this decision to
the Privy Council. In 1772, without written reasons the Privy Council reported to the Crown that the
decision of 1743 be affirmed. In 1773 the Crown confirmed the decision of the Privy Council. See MD
Walters, ‘Mohegan Indians v. Connecticut (1705–1773) and the Legal Status of Aboriginal Customary
Laws and Government in British North America’ (n 44) 803−805.
52 Clinton, ‘The Proclamation of 1763’ (n 34) 336.
53 DJ Hulsebosch, Constituting Empire. New York and the Transformation of Constitutionalism in
the Atlantic World, 1644–1830 (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press and American Society
for Legal History, 2005).
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jurisdiction over it was and is held in trust by the chiefs.54 Despite ‘the strong
self-interest of colonial government’, British law increasingly sought to assure the
Native Americans of a continued right of occupancy of their lands.55 With the
French in the north and west, and to a lesser extent the Spanish in the south,
competing for trade, land and influence over the Native Americans, the security of
the Empire—as reports of the Board of Trade show—was decisive in later efforts to
protect Native Americans and to establish a uniform policy in relation to them.56
Aggressive settlers in the marshland were always on the verge of offending and
violating the rights of the Native Americans, opposing the interests of the Native
Americans and the Empire. Thus the delicate question of the legality of land grants
or de facto settlements also divided the Empire and the provincials. The British in
the metropolis were willing to acknowledge a de facto control of parcel and
purchase of land by the Native Americans. The pace of settlement, much to the
displeasure of the provincials, was thus determined by the geopolitics of the
Empire.57
Following 150 years of British colonial experience in North America, the Royal
Proclamation of 1763 established a boundary line ‘for the present’—that is,
without prejudice for future unilateral changes—dividing the territories of Native
Americans and the European Colonies. It was the first legal demarcation of the
British exclusive settlement and of domains reserved exclusively for the occupancy
of the western Native American tribes.58 These were now geographical legal spaces.
But they retained their ethnocentric character: the geo-legal space created by the
British, in which the Natives were cartographic outsiders, was to be governed by
the imperial rule of law. The Native Americans were permitted certain self-
government within their temporal spaces, although the Crown contemplated the
possibility of imperial agents living among them.59 The possibility of controlling the
Native Americans from the inside was essential for the security of the Empire.
However, the colonists did not respect the segregated spaces of the indigenous tribes
and the Empire, and the Empire—concerned with other immediate interests than
the Indigenous affairs after the peace with France—did not pursue an effective
implementation of the Royal Proclamation.60 In less than 15 years, the War of
Independence had begun.
54 J Tully, ‘Aboriginal Property and Western Theory: Recovering a Middle Ground’ (n 35) 164.
55 Clinton, ‘The Proclamation of 1763’ (n 34) 331.
56 In view of the dispute with France over control of trade with the Five Nations Iroquois
Confederation, the Board of Trade reported to the Queen in 1709 that ‘it is absolutely necessary for the
security of the Province of New York, and the rest of your Majesty’s Dominions in that part of America
that the five Nations of Indians be preserved and maintained in their subjection to the Crown of Great
Britain as formerly.’ Quoted by Clinton, ‘The Proclamation of 1763’ (n 34) 337.
57 Hulsebosch, Constituting Empire (n 53) 100–101.
58 Clinton, ‘The Proclamation of 1763’ (n 34) 356.
59 At different moments this was proposed by the imperial agents in the province of New York, for
example by William Johnson, and contemplated by the Board of Trade in a report to the Crown in 1764;
see Clinton, ‘The Proclamation of 1763’ (n 34) 353, 358–59.
60 ibid 360.
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Who Is Sovereign? The Re-Design of an Imperial Order and the Dawn of
Modernity in the British Realm
The incoherent origins of the British Empire’s presence in North America were a
reflection of England’s internal political strife. This was fuelled by the existence of
two conflicting official versions of the constitutional theory of the British Empire:
on the one hand, assertions of royal prerogative and, on the other, sovereign claims
by the Parliament. Within the British Realm, the royal prerogative was evidently
limited after the Glorious Revolution of 1688. However, this did not prevent the
king from issuing royal proclamations for the colonies until the very last days
before the revolution in North America (1775). Consciousness of a parliamentary
sovereignty in the realm gradually increased during the eighteenth century. This was
evident once the Crown became dependent on Parliament for its financial and
military resources, prompting Parliament to exercise its rights to make law for the
colonies.61 But whether the law was presented as royal or parliamentary, it was
imperial, and thus increasingly identified with a new liberal imperial order.
The outcome of the power struggle between King and Parliament would
ultimately give Parliament absolute sovereignty over the British Empire. Among the
strategies adopted by the Parliamentarians, characterising the common law as a law
formed by a de-localised set of transcendental principles that nonetheless admitted
change over time was especially favoured.62 Common law was transformed into a
barrier against absolutism and also into a lingua franca of the Empire.63 Through
their reasoning, lawyers would breathe life into and take custody of these
fundamental laws.64 In the ancient legal and religious tradition of England, the
claims of an absolutist king were not only illegal but also against God.65 While
Philip II was crafting his godly cities for men in South America, the equally active
Reformation was fragmenting this ideal in the northern European geography.
Rather than entrenching power through cartographic presence, the British Empire
inaugurated modernity and the mechanics of modern imperial expansion by
unfolding law’s scope.
From the reign of Henry VIII, the potential for legal challenges by external
jurisdictions was nullified. Henry had denied the universal jurisdiction of the Pope,
defying the summons to Rome because ‘the King may lawfully disobey the
citation.’66 He instructed his agent in Rome to argue according to the principles of
Roman law that no jurisdiction could be exercised over the king by an organ extra
territorium: ‘a king who does not recognise a superior is free from any outside
61 E Moglen, Settling the Law. Legal Development in Provincial New York (unpublished disserta-
tion, 1998) http://moglen.law.columbia.edu/publications/stl.pdf 270.
62 See JGA Pocok, ‘Burke and the Ancient Constitution – A Problem in the History of Ideas’ (1960)
3 Historical Journal 125.
63 Hulsebosch, Constituting Empire (n 53) 29.
64 cf JGA Pocock, ‘Burke and the Ancient Constitution’, (n 62) 125.
65
‘Ipse autem rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub deo et sub lege, quia lex facit regem’, which
is the formula of Bracton’s conception of kingship. See E Lewis, ‘King Above law? “Quod Principi
Placuit” in Bracton’ (1964) 39 Speculum 240, 265–67.
66 W Ullmann, ‘This Realm of England is an Empire’ (1979) 30 Journal of Ecclesiastical History,
186–87.
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jurisdiction.’67 The external battle against Rome was won, but the consequences of
establishing independent jurisdiction and power over the political and the ecclesias-
tical were radical. By the mid-eighteenth century, the British Parliament acting in its
legislative capacity had assumed the position of absolute sovereign.68
Hobbes and the Introduction of Self-interest
Thomas Hobbes’s recommendation in Leviathan was that governments should not
only tame the clergy, but also control the religious expression of citizens through
law. The sovereign’s civil authority, the authority of the Leviathan, would rest in the
citizens through the constitution of the commonwealth. According to Hobbes, the
civil sovereign would be the authority in religious questions, and the authority in
civil matters would, in turn, emanate from the citizens constituted in an assembly.
In short, the complete jurisdiction over the divine is effectively transferred to the
hands of the Leviathan:
I conclude therefore, that in all things not contrary to the Morall Law, (that is to say, to
the Law of Nature,) all subjects are bound to obey that for divine law, which is declared to
be so, by the Lawes of the Commonwealth.69
Ahead of his time, Hobbes proposed a liberal system of the rule of law that united
the previously separate theological and civil jurisdictions. His text was nevertheless
attuned to the new post-revolutionary legal and intellectual environment of
Interregnum England (1648–60), which was marked by a firm belief in the
subordination of ecclesiastical authority to state power and by the promotion of
religious tolerance and religious scepticism.70
A key issue for the transformations envisaged by Hobbes was the re-definition
of the ‘relationship between the corporate church and the modernising English
state.’71 Another concern was who or what would occupy the position left by a
universal divine experience. In post-Restoration England, the Anglican Church
would be safely identified with the English nation and thus with her political
organisation. However, the first attempts at building a cosmopolitan Empire in
which religious diversity—if only Christian diversity—prevailed, suggested that a
greater free rein of authority was at the disposal of the rulers of the Empire than
to the rulers of England. Indeed, in the absence of an imperial Church, the British
Empire during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries embodied the ideal
situation depicted in Leviathan, in which the temporal sphere dominates the
67 ibid 187.
68 Black, ‘The Constitution of Empire’ (n 47) 1210–11; Hulsebosch, Constituting Empire (n 53) 39.
69 T Hobbes, E Curley (ed) Leviathan (Indianapolis,Hackett Publishing, 1994) 199.
70 JR Collins, The Allegiance of Thomas Hobbes (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005) 48.
71 ibid 205; A Orford, ‘International law and the Making of the Modern State: Reflections on a
Protestant Project’ (2008) 3 In-Spire: Journal of Law, Politics and Societies 5.
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former spiritual jurisdictions.72 Accordingly, the transcendental experience in legal
formulae disappeared and law became a metaphysical, self-sustaining law.
By rejecting the role of religious faith in government, Hobbes introduced a new
dogma to political philosophy: the credo of self-interest.73 Following Hobbes, the
notion appears as a foundational element in philosophical and political theory and
in the practice of a commercial and secular Empire. Famously, Hobbes declared
that a commonwealth is generated through a causality of interests. Building a
commonwealth is the only way that human beings have to defend themselves
against invasion by foreigners and attacks upon each other, and the only way to
secure the production of industry and farming. The introduction of ‘that restraint
upon themselves’, in which ‘we see’ human beings ‘live in Commonwealths’ is ‘the
foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby’.74 To
protect their interests, they ‘may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto
one Will’.75
In a Hobbesian commonwealth, the reason to obey is protection. If protection
ceases, the self-interest of the individual makes her free to turn to self-protection.76
Contrary to the opinion of Aristotle, who sustained that there are two regimes, one
for the advantage of the ruler and another to the advantage of the subjects, Hobbes
claimed that ‘all the advantages and disadvantages of the regime itself are the same
for ruler and subject alike and are shared by both of them.’77 The ‘first and greatest
advantage’ that Hobbes alludes to in this passage is ‘peace and defence, and it is the
same for both’. In the specific question of taxes, to which tradition attributes the
loss of the colonies in North America, Hobbes thinks that if the ruler extracts ‘only
what the administration of government requires, that is equally advantageous for
himself and the citizens for their common peace and defence.’78 The psychology of
self-interest made Hobbes personally prefer the monarchy because private and
public interests more easily coincide in the person of the monarch than in the
members of an assembly:
The King must be carefull in his politique person to procure the common interest, yet he is
more, or no less carefull to procure the private good of himselfe, his family, kindred and
friends; and for the most part, if the interest chance to crosse the private, he prefers the
72 Strong explains that the Anglican Church maintained a strict partnership with the state until the
constitutional revolution of 1828–32. By the 1840s, the ‘fundamental Episcopalian identity for an
imperial Anglicanism was more readily achievable once the Church of England had adopted a new
self-directing identity, initiated at the metropolitan centre, and taken up also in the colonial peripheries,
which no longer looked to the old paradigm of a partnership with the state, which had prevailed until
then.’ R Strong, Anglicanism and the British Empire, c. 1700–1850 (Oxford, Oxford University Press,
2007) 290.
73 About the position of Hobbes as part and leader of a tradition see A Cromartie, ‘Harringtonian
Virtue: Harrington, Machiavelli, and the Method of the Moment’ (1998) 41 The Historical Journal 987.
74 Hobbes, Leviathan (n 69) 117.
75 ibid 120.
76 ibid 153.
77 S Moller Okin, ‘The Sovereign and His Counsellours: Hobbes’s Reevaluation of Parliament’
(1982) 10 Political Theory 49, 69.
78 T Hobbes, R Tuck (ed) and M Silverthorne (ed) On the Citizen – Cambridge Texts in the History
of Political Thought (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007) 116–17 (emphasis added).
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private: for the Passions of men are commonly more potent than their Reason. From
whence it follows that where the publique and private interest are most closely united,
there is the publique most advanced.79
What is remarkable about this passage is Hobbes’ substitution of theological
language by a language of interests.
By the mid-eighteenth century, the rule of law in the British Empire had already
acquired one notably modern characteristic: representation was neither derived
from the divine body of the king nor was it any longer conceived along traditional
geographical principles. The new law was based in the abstract representation
assumed to exist through de facto authority and the universality of self-interest.80
Its imperial dimension was not based on the peoples of the different territories,
although England and its colonies did possess representative assemblies in the
traditional sense. Rather, the representation of the Empire increasingly adopted the
model proposed in the Leviathan:81 a covenant by which the English citizens of the
Empire had entered the polity of the Empire for reasons of self-interest.82 In this
way, the law was based on the authority of the sovereign and sovereignty was based
on the law of the Empire. In spite of all the elaborate theories about the origin of
the commonwealth by Hobbes and subsequent liberals, the subjects and society of
this model have no telos. The earlier Christian and humanist language of perfection
was replaced by an obscure secular version of transcendental order. Self-interest
replaced the need to materialise perfection in spatial terms. Self-interest became the
credo of a new civil religion and the new intangible, yet resilient, universal for the
Empire.
In the year of Leviathan’s publication, the laws that became the foundation of the
commercial identity of the Empire were passed. The Navigation Acts, which aimed to
control the Empire and its commerce, contained protective measures for fostering
English shipping during times of peace: all the commerce of the colonies was required
to pass through England and take place solely on English ships—a system that lasted
until the nineteenth century.83 The issue was no longer sovereignty of the seas, but
79 Hobbes, Leviathan (n 69) 131; S Moller Okin, ‘The Sovereign and His Counsellours: Hobbes’s
Reevaluation of Parliament’ (1982)10 Political Theory 49, 51–53. Like other supporters of popular
rights in the 17th century, Hobbes did not claim sovereignty for the Parliament—something that,
paradoxically, demonstrates signs of modernity in his doctrine. Cf J Neville Figgis, ‘Political Thought in
the Sixteenth Century’, in AW Ward, GW Prothero and S Leathes (eds), The Wars of Religion
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1904) 748–49.
80 Q Skinner, ‘Hobbes on Representation’ (2005) 13 European Journal of Philosophy 155.
81 Black pinpoints the shift in theory through which the Parliament became supreme authority to the
mid-eighteenth century, while Goebel, like many others, signals the Glorious Revolution of 1688, and
some others to the Commonwealth Act of 1649. Black, ‘The Constitution of Empire’ (n 47) 1210–11.
What we have tried to show here is that the seed was already planted by 1651, with the modern notion
of law offered in the Leviathan and even in some of Hobbes’s previous works.
82 A fact, which might explain the loss of the North American colonies, since as Moglen explains,
they and the Empire had strikingly opposed interests. See E Moglen, Settling the Law. Legal
Development in Provincial New York (n 46).
83 RG Marsden, ‘Early Prize Jurisdiction and Prize Law in England’ (1911) 26 The English
Historical Review 34, 39.
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monopoly of trade and effective policing of the sea.84 What is remarkable is that the
English Parliament inaugurated a legal system for all the territories of the Empire
designed for times of peace with enforcement capability to prosecute offenders of any
nation in violation of the Acts. Self-interest and absolute authority over divine and civil
jurisdictions, embodied in trade and independence, provided the new coordinates for
the order of the Empire.
REFLECTIONS ON EMPIRE, PUBLIC ORDER AND THE SACRED
Humanism, Empire and International Law
An analysis of the legal and political projects of colonisation in North and South
America reveals a desire by European sovereigns to create a new public order in the
new continent. As is characteristic of imperial projects, both empires were com-
pelled by a redemptive idea.85 In the complicated terrain of faith and governmen-
tality in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Spain and England each played a
crucial role in the inauguration of modernity. For them, the New World was the
revolutionary extension of the Old World’s territory, a place where it was possible
to implement their political projects and to create the foundations of an interna-
tional law that made sense of their world views and their ideas of order.86 In both
the North and South, robbery, pillage, slavery and abuses of indigenous people and
colonists alike were accompanied by the ideal of starting anew, of a governmental
system that must improve on the existing systems in Spain and England. These new
spaces were a great studio in which to experiment with new political ideas: in the
South, godly cities for men; in the North, rational jurisdictions of liberty and
commerce. The desire for renewal that inflamed European minds is evident in the
way in which the colonisation of the New World took place.
Although material goods typically flowed one-way from the colonies to Spain
and England, the empires perceived a transaction to be taking place. In their view,
the order brought to the colonial reality was a gift: precious knowledge that had
been acquired painfully at home. Spain, in the midst of the counter-reformation,
aimed to create godly cities of men. England, after bitter struggles for power
between rival political and religious factions, transmitted to America the revolu-
tionary ideal that worldly affairs should take precedence over ecclesiastical and
religious matters.
In both Spanish and British colonies, subjects participating in the new imperial
order were obliged to convert. The indigenous people in the South and the Spanish
imperial subjects that administered the colonies required a conversion to enter the
84 WG Grewe, Epochen der Völkerrechtsgeschichte (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1988) 343–45. See also,
TC Wade, ‘The Roll De Superioritate Maris Angliae. The Foundations of the Stewart Claim to the
Sovereignty of the Sea’ (1921–1922) 2 British Yearbook of International Law 99.
85 Jouannet, ‘Universalism and Imperialism’ (n 11) 383.
86 See on the role of colonies in the imperial persue of order, M Foucault, ‘Des Espaces Autres’
(1984) Architecture, Mouvement, Continuité 46 www.foucault.info/documents/heteroTopia/
foucault.heteroTopia.en.html.
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city. In the North, the indigenous people had to give up everything they had
previously owned—beliefs, culture and material goods—if they wanted to partici-
pate in the life of the British colony. British colonists who entered the new order of
the Empire also had to convert to the new liberalism and commerce of the
government. However, the necessity of conversion represents a weakness of the
imperial orders, and of the law produced by them. The requirement for conversion
makes it apparent that neither empire dominated the law. Neither the Spanish nor
the British empires were masters of the law, in the sense that they were unable to
craft a superior law that would accept the plurality of their imperial subjects.
The Atlantic slave trade, an issue which connected the activities of the English
and the Spanish from the mid-1500s,87 exemplifies the theoretical tensions and
internal ambiguities of both imperial projects; or to put it in another way, the
public order they created was sustained to a large extent by power, rather than by
internal coherence. The Spanish Empire believed that order could be created
through the design and construction of theological-legal spaces. Even though they
were imagined as utopias, these spaces were also mundane arrangements to
organise the economy that lubricated the Empire. The desire by the new English
order to become absolute sovereign over the secular and the divine produced a
liberal Empire under the rule of law. The rise of the English Parliament in the
seventeenth century to sovereign of the Empire offered influential social groups the
possibility of preserving their economic interests, and to promote free trade, even in
human beings. For this reason, the Atlantic slave trade escalated dramatically in the
early eighteenth century.88 The Spanish, for whom the slave trade conditioned to a
great extent the pursuit of the Empire, were actively engaged in this commercial
enterprise with the English.89 In dark contrast to the ideal of the imperial cities of
God and to the pursuit of human flourishing through representation without
subjection to a superior being, the slave trade demonstrates that both the Spanish
and the British Empire denied the practicability of their own legal orders.
Despite the theological tenor of the Spanish project, the British and the Spanish
empires’ expansive territorial ventures heralded the great anthropocentric shift that
occurred in the political philosophy of modern Europe. The antipathy towards the
notion of considering God as an agent of human history is made explicit in the
secularisation programme pursued by the British Empire.90 The absorption of the
religious into the civil jurisdiction at the beginning of the British Empire eventually
confined the religious to the private conscience, and erased all references to the
sacred from the public sphere. As we have seen, there was some hesitancy about the
way in which sovereignty would be implemented during the shift of authority’s
locus from King to Parliament. From the outset, however, the British clearly
87 See generally, JA Rawley and SD Behrendt, The Transatlantic Slave Trade: A History (Lincoln,
University of Nebraska Press, 2005) 55.
88 See especially, WA Pettigrew, ‘Parliament and the Escalation of the Slave Trade, 1690–1714’
(2007) 26 Parliamentary History 12.
89 Rawley and Behrendt, The Transatlantic Slave Trade (n 87) 5.
90 C Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge MA, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007) 270.
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favoured a secular imperial public order. In the Spanish conquest, the rejection of
divine agency was more subtle, but nonetheless apparent in the planners’ aim to
supplant God’s role.
The colonisation of the New World demonstrates that both empires drew
strength from humanism. The notion of humanism invoked here embraces both
transcendent humanism, which transferred the power of God to human beings as
divine agents that would construct terrestrial cities of God, and immanent human-
ism that adhered to the new philosophy of self-interested universalism.91 This does
not mean that humanism is a bad thing, or that humanism is equivalent to empire,
but rather that the two imperial legal expansions examined in this article can be
identified as humanist projects. As argued by Koskenniemi, the most imperialist
aspect of international law is its humanist civilising mission.92
In a recent article based on a psychoanalytical interpretation of international law,
Jouannet traces the long tradition of imperialist search for a universal in interna-
tional law to the common view that locates human nature between passion and
reason.93 This dualist interpretational grid of human nature has been a constant in
Western philosophy dating back to Plato’s commitment to the attainment of our
highest state in a condition beyond the body, which is viewed as a hindrance that
must be controlled and disciplined in this life.94 Drawing on the work of Nathaniel
Berman on the relationship of international law and the psychoanalytical study of
human nature, Jouannet argues that the constitutive ambivalence of human identity
is mirrored in the ways that international law has sought to mask the hegemonic
passions latent in actions taken by the League of Nations and the United Nations:
from Upper Silesia to Saarland, and more recently in places such as Kosovo,
Palestine and Bosnia. On the other hand, the rational has more often appeared in
the form of the authoritarian approach to a crisis, like the recent war of Iraq, with
a claim to the objectivity of the rules of international law and the legal discourse
deployed during the invasion.95 Jouannet’s analysis reflects important imperial
tendencies of the past and current searches for order in international law, some of
which we have identified in this paper.
A Global Public Order?
Teitel describes the increasing constructive international rule of law, which she
identifies with the merger of the laws of war and human rights legal systems, as ‘a
91 cf with M Hardt and A Negri, Empire (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 2000) 91–92.
92 See for example, M Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of
International Law, 1870–1960 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002) and Jouannet, ‘Univer-
salism and Imperialism’ (n 11) 403.
93 Jouannet, ‘Universalism and Imperialism’ (n 11) 403–407.
94 Taylor, A Secular Age (n 90) 276. See of Plato’s idealism and dualism, H Kelsen, ‘Platonic Justice’
(1938) 48 Ethics 367; For an explanation of Kelsen’s own legal theory in Platonic philosophy, see G
Edel, ‘Kantianismus oder Platonismus? Hypothesis als Grundbegriff der Philosophie Cohens’ (1991) 1/2
Il Cannochiale. Revista di studi filosofi 59.
95 Jouannet, ‘Universalism and Imperialism’ (n 11) 403–405. See also, N Berman, ‘A Perilous
Ambivalence: Nationalist Desire, Legal Autonomy, and the Limits of the Interwar Framework’ (1992)
33 Harvard International Law Journal 353.
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shift of paradigm in international law’.96 She claims that a depoliticised legalist
language of rights and wrongs, which has gradually supplanted the previous
discourse centred on state interests, consensus and deliberation, has been effectively
extended by new bodies of the judiciary type through penetration of existing legal
sovereign entities. This phenomenon can be compared with the situation under
imperial law, when the law of nations understood itself as extraterritorial law, and
assumed that it was capable of influencing or cancelling local politics.
Beyond the recurrent appearance of hegemonic politics in the international order,
there have been new sources of inspiration to rethink the concept of international
law. Previous notions of the international legal system have shown how it is
insufficient, unless it can be renovated by attempting to include deliberative
democracy as a primary value in international governance. The argument that
international law has moved beyond pure bilateralism is convincing.97 In this
context, enhancing the legitimacy of international law means, for example, the
strengthening of national parliaments’ influence over foreign relations, an area
traditionally monopolised by heads of government.98 These arguments make clear
that a public order, which aims to be global, and therefore not imperialistic, must
incorporate a methodology and an ideology of democratic participation.
In an era of globalisation, the aspiration for a public global order remains—
despite doctrinal differences—an important common goal. We argue that the
re-thinking of international law and of a global public order should not seek to
revive redemptive imperial plans, but instead acknowledge the proliferation of
pseudo-juridical relations on a global scale, all of them interacting in a state of
quasi-anarchy. In the absence of a purposive common good in international society,
with the political division of the world in more than 200 states, the very notion of
a global public order may very well function as a common good.99 The attribute of
commonness in this good is neither irrelevant nor incidental. The notion of
commonness contains also an ideal of tolerance, of accepting something as common
and consenting to something that may offend individual interests.100 In short, it
means adopting the opposite attitude that the empires took in their creation of
public order. The imperial position in the production of order was to silence
(through action or omission) the dissenting voice. Today, it is hard to imagine even
the skeleton of a global public order without a spirit of tolerance for diversity.
Legal efficiency should also give way to an attitude of tolerance to what is
idiosyncratic in the foreign. Von Bogdandy has noted that to postulate utopian
ideas—that is, laws without a locus in space—as legal principles, harms the
96 See generally, RG Teitel, ‘Humanity’s Law: Rule of Law for the New Global Politics’ (2002) 35
Cornell International Law Journal 355.
97 B Kingsbury, The International Legal Order (NYU Law School, 2003, Public Law Research Paper
No 01–04; IILJ Working Paper No 2003/1) http://ssrn.com/abstract=692626 or DOI: 10.2139/
ssrn.692626.
98 Wolfrum and Röben, Legitimacy in International Law (n 4) 23.
99 J Klabbers, ‘Constitutionalism and the Making of International Law: Fuller’s Procedural Natural
Law’ (2008) 5 No Foundations. Journal of Extreme Legal Positivism 84, 102 para 6. www.helsinki.fi/
nofo. In this regard, Wolfrum considers that international law has developed its own system of values:
Wolfrum and Röben, Legitimacy in International Law (n 4) 24.
100 JHH Weiler, Una Europa Cristiana (Madrid, Ediciones Encuentro 2003) 136.
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normativity of law.101 To put it differently, tolerance of non-Western, non-secular
principles that have a topos in large territories and communities would promote the
strength of international normativity. As we have seen, the imposition of utopian
ideals by force and the destruction of indigenous principle within colonised
territories was the way for the British and Spanish Empires to protect their validity
of law. In this regard, current critiques of the anti-pluralism of a supposedly
international order are meaningful and rich: at present, there is a risk that
important pieces of international legislation will remain insignificant speeches to
the greater part of the world’s population, which does not share the liberal values
and aspirations that are promoted by the prevailing international order.102 Along
the same vein, there is an urgent need in global jurisprudence to give greater weight
and consideration to international affairs that do not involve one of the superpow-
ers: commonness means also common interest.103
Although there are several territorial international unions of states with an
important level of interaction between their members, such as the African Union,
the Commonwealth and the Organization of American States, there is also reason
to encourage the study of publicness in the European Union experience. The
European Union has produced a wealth of legal principles concerning the relation-
ship between the Union and its member states, which could enrich the core of a
global public order in international law. Moreover the European Union has often
managed to organise and channel public authority over private interests and
powers.104 However, it is suggested here that in two particular important features
of a global public order, inspiration should be sought in other places. First, there
should be a serious interrogation about the role of the sacred in the European
public sphere, and secondly about the notion of reason on which the European
Union normative tradition is based. In his exploratory essay Un’Europa Cristiana,
Weiler highlights the importance of learning the spirit of tolerance, which was
conspicuously absent in ‘the imperial constitutional politics’ that surrounded the
drafting of the treaty for a Constitution of Europe.105 An important reason for this
is that in the European constitutional tradition, the sacred has been judged by
modern reason to lie outside rational discourse and therefore relegated outside the
public sphere.106 The key expression in this latter sentence is ‘modern reason’,
whose genesis lies in the consolidation of the Spanish and British Empires. We
suggest that a broader notion of reason than the one offered by modernity may be
101 A von Bogdandy, ‘General Principles of International Public Authority: Sketching a Research
Field’ (2008) 9 German Law Journal 1909, 1913.
102 See H Charlesworth, ‘The Challenges of Human Rights for Religious Traditions’ in MW Janis
and C Evans (eds), Religion and International Law (The Hague, Nijhoff, 1999).
103 cf, eg, the wealth of scholarly literature regarding the International Court of Justice’s decisions on
Military and Paramilitary Activities and Oil Platform cases, where the United States was a party, to the
scant attention received by Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of
Congo v Uganda), B Kingsbury and J Weiler, ‘Preface: Studying the Armed Activities Decision’ (2008)
40 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 2.
104 von Bogdandy, ‘General Principles of International Public Authority (n 101) 1909, 1916.
105 Weiler, Una Europa Cristiana (n 100) 50.
106 JHH Weiler, ‘La tradición judeo–cristiana entre fe y libertad’ in J Ratzinger et al Dios salve la
razón (n 1) 196.
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useful for the consideration of a global public order. Modern reason might at this
juncture make room for a reason that is able to deal with the transcendental, a
sacred order that does not cancel difference, diversity or dissent. In legal philoso-
phy, modern reason has attempted to substitute the sacred by ideals embodied in
reason, passions, economy and humanity.107 Each of these has been integrated in
previous paradigms of international public law, even though each of them arises
periodically in constant struggle with each other.108 A possible way to avoid legal
absolutism is to admit a notion of reason that is free from the need to worship the
inanimate.
The global public sphere would be better represented by a broader conception of
publicness in which the sacred is possible. This can occur only when the public
order does not aim to integrate the civil and the theological jurisdictions into one.
The experiences of the Spanish and British Empires demonstrate that integration
results in one of the two jurisdictions thriving at the expense of the other: the
English and the Spanish took an either/or position on this question, and used
religion instrumentally as a legitimising or delegitimising factor of previous legal
orders. In both cases, imperial subjects were required to convert in an un-free total
acceptance or total rejection of the sacred in the public sphere. It is doubtful that
similar imperialistic positions can be maintained today. Only a global public order
that is open to the sacred (perhaps through dialogue as endless contingency) has
resonances of what we would accept as truly democratic.
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